Over the last decade, nite-state veri cation methods have been developed to an impressive tool for analysis of complex programs, such as protocols and hardware circuits. Partial-order reduction and BDDbased symbolic model checking have been instrumental in this development. Currently, much e ort is devoted to advancing further the power of automated veri cation to cover also in nite-state systems. A prominent class of in nite-state systems are so-called parameterized systems, i.e., systems with many similar processes, in which the number of processes is unbounded and their interconnection pattern may vary within the range of some constraints. In this paper, we partially review the use of induction over the system structure for the veri cation of parameterized systems. Wolper and Lovinfosse have introduced the term network invariant for the induction hypothesis in such a proof by induction. They also observe that well-behaved (e.g., nite-state) network invariants do not always exist, even if the system itself satis es the property to be veri ed. The main novel contribution of this paper is to present some su cient conditions, under
Introduction
One of the advantages of producing formal models of algorithms and systems is the possibility to analyze and verify them in a rigorous way, in the best case totally automatically by computer. For nondeterministic and parallel programs, relevant veri cations include absence of deadlocks, or proving that all executions of a program satisfy a desirable property expressed in temporal logic. Over the last decade, impressive tools have been developed for veri cation of nite-state systems. Partial-order reduction and BDD-based symbolic model checking have been instrumental in this development. Currently, much e ort is devoted to advancing further the power of automated veri cation to cover also in nite-state systems. Potentially practical tools for automated veri cation of in nite-state systems have been developed for signi cant special cases, such as timed automata ACD90, BGK + 96], hybrid automata Hen95], data-independent systems JP93, Wol86], Petri nets JM95], pushdown processes BS95, Sti96] , and systems with unbounded communication channels Fin94, AJ93, ABJ98]. One particularly interesting class of in nite-state systems are the so-called parameterized systems. By a parameterized system, we mean a family of similar systems that depend in a regular way on a parameter. Typically, parameterized systems are built from a (small) nite set of processes, which are replicated and interconnected into networks. Examples of parameterized systems abound: a distributed algorithm can be modeled as a system of many identical processes whose interconnection topology may be arbitrary, a bus protocol consists of a linear array of identical processes where the parameter is the number of processes, etc. Also unbounded data structures, such as queues and trees, could be regarded as parameterized systems by letting each node (cell) be viewed as a process which is connected to its neighbour nodes (cells). A queue would thus be viewed as a linear array of processes of arbitrary length.
In order to make the discussion more concrete, let us consider families of systems of the form P 0 k P k P k k P composed of one instance of a \global" component P 0 which is common to all systems in the family, and an arbitrary number of instances of some process P. The processes are composed by some associative composition operator k , which for the moment will be left unspeci ed. The veri cation problem for parameterized systems consists in verifying that P 0 k P k P k k P j = for some correctness formula , for any number of copies of P. We assume that the formulation of is independent of the system size. An example of a correctness property could be \there are never two processes simultaneously in the critical section". The most straight-forward approach to verifying a parameterized system is to verify the system for a suitable chosen number (say 5) of processes. Finitestate state-space exploration methods can be used to analyze the system e ciently. However, there is no a priori guarantee that the system will function correctly with 6 processes. It is therefore of interest to consider methods that verify the correctness of the system with an arbitrary number of components. It may even (as argued, e.g., by Wolper and Boigelot WB98]) turn out that the parameterized version of the system is easier to verify, since in the best case it may concern the essential reason for correctness, and avoid the particularities of the case with 5 processes. If we look at the problem of actually verifying that any system in the family satis ed , we notice that the problem has an unbounded structure along two dimensions. One dimension is \time", since we must check a property of potentially unbounded execution sequences. Another dimension is \space", since the property should hold for an arbitrary system size. To verify that the system is correct, in spite of any of these unboundednesses, we may use induction. In the following two paragraphs, we describe the use of induction, rst in the time dimension and then in the space dimension. The standard way to handle the time dimension in veri cation is to nd an (inductive) invariant of the system, which is preserved by all computation steps of the system, and which implies (e.g., MP95]). For instance, if is the above correctness property \there are never two processes simultaneously in the critical section", then an inductive invariant of the system could be obtained by conjoining \at most one process has the token" (assuming that possessing the token is necessary for entering the critical section). This method of veri cation can be applied if we can express sets of system states of arbitrary size. Finding an invariant may involve some ingenuity. However, once it is found, the rest of the veri cation is relatively simple and possible to automate. A method for handling the space dimension in parameterized system veri cation is to nd a uniform abstraction of all system sizes. Such an abstraction is a single system N whose behavior \contains" (in a sense to be made more precise later in the paper) the behavior of any system in the family. In particular, if N j = , then P 0 k P k k P j = for any system size. One su cient criterion for checking that N is indeed an abstraction is to check that it is inductive. Letting denote the relation \contained in", this means that it should be checked that P 0 N and that N k P N besides checking that N j = . The term \network invariant" has been introduced by Wolper and Lovinfosse WL89] (similar independent work was also reported by Kurshan and McMillan KM89] ) for an abstraction which is inductive in this sense.
Again, nding a network invariant N may involve some ingenuity. However, the point is that once N is found, the correctness checks should be relatively simple and possible to automate. For verifying a parameterized system, there are thus two basically di erent ways to employ induction: either using standard (computational) induction, or using induction over the structure of the parameterized system. To avoid confusion, we will use the term computational invariant to mean an inductive invariant in the \time-dimension". Computational invariants expressed in some formalism for represented sets of states of unbounded system sizes have been used e.g., in JK95, KMM + 97, EFM99, A CJYK96, AJ98, ABJN99]. Network invariants have been employed in KM89, WL89, EN95, LHR97]. Abstraction has also been used in LS97, CGJ95] .
In this paper, we will consider the question \when does there exist a computational or network invariant of a certain simple form?" If we consider the case that each component is nite-state, it is natural to try to look for \ nite" computational and network invariants. In the case of computational invariants, we will take this to mean an invariant which considers an arbi-trary \ nite" part of the system structure. In the case of network invariants, we will take this to mean an invariant which can be expressed by a nitestate transition system. As observed by Wolper and Lovinfosse WL89], it follows from a basic undecidability result by Apt and Kozen AK86] , that such invariants do not exist in general. In this paper, we will give some sucient criteria for the existence of these invariants. We hope that this gives a better understanding in particular of the network invariant method. Wolper and Lovinfosse stated some undecidability results concerning their existence, but gave no positive results, other than a few examples where the method worked. Mechanized search for network invariants have been considered by Lesens et al LHR97] , who employ maximal xpoint iteration, enhanced by approximation techniques, in the veri cation of some examples. The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the basic de nitions of parameterized systems. The use of invariants in veri cation is described in Section 3. Section 4 contains criteria for the existence of computational and network invariants. In Section 5, we illustrate the veri cation of a parameterized system in which the components are non-nite state (timed automata).
Basic De nitions
Parameterized Systems By a parameterized system, we mean a family of systems, each of which is a composition of form
where P 0 is an optional \global" component, common to all instances in the family, and where P 1]; : : :; P n] are identical processes. Each component P i] and P 0 is modeled as a labeled transition system. For the moment, we do not require that this transition system be nite-state. The labels on transitions are taken from a set of visible actions, extended by an invisible action (denoted ). We assume that any component can always perform an idling component transition, labeled by , which does not change its state.
We use M to denote the in nite-state system which is the \union" of the family fM n g 1 n=0 of system instances. One could think of M as a system, which initially decides on a value of the parameter n, and then becomes M n .
Each transition of the system may involve one or more components. The possible synchronizations between components are constrained by a synchronization predicate . In the remainder of this paper, we will consider a totally unordered system topology, in which any component can communicate with any other, regardless of their positions in the syntactic description of M n .
The synchronization predicate is then a set of multisets of actions which describes the possible combinations of labels on component transitions that make up a transition of the parameterized system. For instance, if the set fsend; receiveg is in , but neither of send nor receive is in any other set of the synchronization predicate, then each occurrence of a send must be synchronized with a matching receive. In order to be able to model broadcast and global synchronizations, we allow one of the actions in a synchronization to have the special superscript !, meaning \all other processes". For instance the set fsend; receive ! g denotes a broadcast by one process to all other processes. We could also have considered parameterized systems with a linearly ordered topology, in which components are arranged in an order, as shown in the syntactic description of M n . The synchronization predicate will then be a set of strings of labels.
Correctness Properties We will only consider linear-time safety properties of parameterized systems, which can be stated as a requirement on the executions of the controller, and a bounded arbitrary set of distinct components. Such properties can be transformed into invariants of the form 8i 1 ; : : :; i k :alldi (i 1 ; : : :; i k ) =) (i 1 ; : : :; i k ) where is a predicate on the local states of the controller and the components with indices i 1 ; : : :; i k , and where alldi (i 1 ; : : :; i k ) states that all indices i 1 ; : : : ; i k are distinct. We shall call such a formula a universal assertion As an example, we can specify mutual exclusion by the invariant 8i 6 = j::
Examples of correctness properties that can be expressed in this form are: mutual exclusion, clock synchronization, security properties, etc. The checking of an invariant can be equivalently reformulated as a reachability property. For instance, the above invariant means that it is not possible to reach a state which satis es the negation 9i 6 = j:(critical i]^critical j]) of the above invariant. We shall call such a formula an existential assertion Example A simple example of a parameterized system is the following simple token-passing mutual exclusion algorithm. An arbitrary set of processes compete for a critical resource. Access to the resource is modeled by a process being in its critical section. In order to enter the critical section, a process must rst acquire a token, which is passed in some arbitrary manner between components.
We model each process as a labeled transition system with three states: n (not possessing the token), t (possessing the token), and c (in the critical section), and two visible actions: send-token and rec-token. A statetransition diagram of a process is given below:
The synchronization predicate requires send-token and rec-token to occur in synchronized pairs. In a network, all process are initialized in the state n, except for one process, which starts in state t. There is no controller process. For this particular example, we could imagine both an unordered and a linearly ordered system topology (of course, any reasonable topology could be considered, but that is not in the scope of this paper). A correctness property for this system is mutual exclusion, formulated as the invariant 8i 6 = j: :(c i]^c j]) 3 Methods for Veri cation of Invariants of Parameterized Systems
In this section, we present the use of computational and of network invariants in the veri cation of a parameterized system. The standard requirements on a computational invariant I are:
Computational Invariants
1. any initial state of any M n satis es I, 2. each transition from a system state satisfying I leads to a system state which also satis es I, 3. I implies .
It is a standard result that the set of invariants I that satisfy these requirements form a lattice with a smallest and a greatest element. The lattice is non-empty if and only if M n j = for all n. There is a least N which satis es the rst two conditions: this is the set of reachable states of M n . There is also a largest N which satis es the two last conditions.
It is well-known that a computational invariant always exists if holds, but there is no guarantee that it can in general be expressed in the particular chosen representation (this follows from the undecidability of parameterized system veri cation AK86]). Methods for automatically searching for a computational invariant include forward and backward reachability analysis, sometimes augmented by approximation techniques, using a symbolic representation of sets of states. In what follows, we shall be particularly interested in nding computational invariants that are expressed as universal assertions. It turns out that backward reachability analysis suits the problem of nding universal assertions.
Example To continue the example in the previous section, we see that a simple computational invariant of any M n is 8i 6 = j: : (t 
which is indeed a universal assertion. Below, we describe the relation to backward reachability in more detail.
Backward Reachability Analysis The basic idea of backward reachability analysis is to start from the negation of the invariant to be checked. If the invariant is a universal assertion, then the negation is an existential assertion. We assume that we can represent sets of states of an arbitrary but bounded set of components. The idea in backward reachability analysis is to compute the set of states from which a state satisfying the negated invariant can be reached. If we further assume that each action of the parameterized system involves a bounded number of components (i.e., the synchronization predicate does not contain any occurrence of the superscript !), then the set of predecessors of an existential assertion can again be expressed as an existential assertion. Having a procedure for calculating pre( ), a formula that represents the set of predecessors of states that satisfy , we can now perform symbolic veri cation as follows. Assume that final is the existential constraint that represent the set of undesirable states, and let initial be a characterization of the initial states of a parameterized system. Typically initial will contain a universal quanti cation over the set of all processes in the network, e.g., saying that they are in their initial states.
A simple description of an algorithm for checking whether final is reachable from initial is as follows KMM + 97]. 
Network Invariants
A method, which has been proposed as a general solution to the veri cation of in nite-state systems, is to nd a nite-state abstraction of the system, which preserves the correctness properties of interest, and thereafter model-checking this nite-state abstraction LS97, LHR97, ID99]. Applied to our framework, this would entail the construction of a process N, whose behavior \contains" the behavior of any instance M n of the family. Since we are considering to check only safety properties, we could for the containment relation (which we will denote by v) choose either inclusion between nite traces of observable actions, or simulation. In both cases, we want that
A methodology, which has been proposed WL89, KM89], is to nd a (preferably nite-state) process N, for which the above relation can be checked by induction, checking P 0 v N, N k P v N, and N j = .
By standard xpoint results, it follows LHR97] that the set of labeled transition systems N that satisfy the above criteria form a lattice with a greatest and smallest element. The lattice is non-empty if and only if M n j = for all n.
There is a least N which satis es the rst two conditions: this is the \union" of all M n . There is also a largest N which satis es the two last conditions: this is the limit of the so-called quotient construction And95, KLL + 97]. However, there is no guarantee that any of these be expressible by a nitestate program even if P 0 and P are nite-state. The discovery of a suitable N is therefore often performed manually (as e.g., in WL89, KM89]), or using approximation techniques LHR97].
Example A network invariant of the system in the preceding section is the 
Generating Simple Invariants
In this section, we shall consider the question of nding a computational or network invariant of a particularly simple form. Recall that we only consider the veri cation of invariants expressed by universal assertions.
Universal Computational Invariants
We shall be concerned with nding computational invariants that are universal. For instance, in the small mutual exclusion example, it was possible to nd a universal invariant. From results by Abdulla et al. A CJYK96], the following theorem follows directly.
Theorem 4.1 If P 0 and P are nite-state, and all synchronizations occur between a bounded number of components, then the largest invariant is universal. Furthermore, it (or rather its negation) can be found after a nite number of iterations of the backward reachability algorithm in the previous section.
The main reason why the algorithm terminates is that it is impossible to generate in nite sequences 0 ; 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; : : : which are strictly increasing. Any such sequence will converge to a largest set after a nite number of iterations. These results have been extended to cover a class of nite-state systems that allow also broadcast EFM99], and to timed automata with one clock in AJ98].
Finite-State Network Invariants
Let us thereafter consider network invariants. A natural desideratum is that such an invariant should not be more di cult to analyze than a single process P. That is, if the processes are nite-state, then the network invariant should be nite-state. In the example, it was easy to nd a nite-state abstraction. However, Wolper and Lovinfosse WL89] observe that by basic undecidability results AK86], there must be cases where a network invariant does not exist (assuming that linearly structured networks are also allowed). In the literature, we have not found any results that guarantee the existence of nite-state network invariants, and we will therefore present conditions under which their existence can be guaranteed. To this end, let us employ a standard framework for describing abstractions of concurrent systems. The abstraction N will be generated by collecting states of M into equivalence classes. This can be described by an abstraction mapping h from states of the family M to states of N Lam89]. The condition for N to be an abstraction is then that We will now investigate conditions for when the process N is inductive. Note that not all abstractions N are inductive: for instance the trivial N which has only one state with self-loops for all actions, is most often not inductive.
De nition 4.2 An abstraction mapping is inductive if whenever h(s 1 ) = h(s 2 ), then for any state t of P we have h(s 1 k t) = h(s 2 k t). Proof: Consider the parallel composition N k P of N and P. We shall prove that there exists an abstraction mapping g from states of N k P to N, from which the theorem follows directly. We rst observe that an inductive abstraction mapping h from states of M to states of N induces a mapping g from states of N k P to states of N by letting g(h(s) k t) = h(s k t), where s is a state of M and t is a state of P, and where s k t denotes the state s of M extended with one extra component in state t. The mapping g is well-de ned since h is inductive. It can also be checked that g is indeed an abstraction mapping.
1. If n and t are initial, then n = h(s) for some initial s, and so g(n k t) = h(s k t) is initial. We will apply this theorem to obtain a result concerning the existence of nite-state abstraction mappings. In this section, we will illustrate the results of the preceding section by verifying a parameterized version of Fischer's protocol. The protocol has been used as a measure of the performance of tools for veri cation of timed automata. The example was suggested by Fred Schneider and has been veri ed manually (e.g., AL92]) and using theorem provers (e.g., Sha93]). Several tools for verifying automata with a xed number of clocks have been used to verify it for an increasing number of processes (e.g. system consisting of an arbitrary number of processes, using clocks and a shared variable. Each process has a local clock, and runs a protocol before entering the critical section. Each process has a local control state, which in our model assumes values in the set fA; B; C; CSg where A is the initial state and CS represents the critical section. The processes also read from and write to a shared variable whose value is either ? or the index of one of the processes. A description in a graphical pseudo-code (taken from KLL + 97]) of the behavior of a process with index i is given in Figure 1 .
Intuitively, the protocol behaves as follows: A process wishing to enter the critical section starts in state A. If the value of the shared variable is ?, the process can proceed to state B and reset its local clock. From state B, the process can proceed to state C if the clock value is still less than 1. In other words, the clock implements a timeout which guarantees that the process either stays in state B at most one time unit, or gets stuck in B forever. When moving from B to C, the process sets the value of the shared variable to its own index i and again resets its clock. From state C, the process can proceed to the critical section if the clock is strictly more than 1 and if the value of the shared variable is still i, the index of the process. Thus, in state C the clock enforces a delay which is longer than the length of the timeout in state B. Finally, when exiting the critical section, the process resets the shared variable to ?. Processes that get stuck in state C can reenter the protocol by returning to state A. Since we do not intend to model liveness properties, such as e.g., absence of starvation, we do not impose requirements that force processes to change their state 1 . A rough argument for the correctness of the protocol goes as follows. The conditions on the shared variable ensure that a process cannot reach B if any other process is in C or CS. The timing conditions on the clocks ensure that a process cannot move from C to CS if some other process is still in B. Thus, if a set of processes start the mutual exclusion protocol and all arrive in C, then the process which was the last to enter C will read its own identity in the shared variable and enter the critical section. In this paper, we have considered methods for verifying parameterized systems using induction. We have considered the use of computational induction, and of induction over the network structure. The main contribution has been to give conditions under which there are guarantees for the existence of inductive invariants of a simple form. For the case of computational induction, we have merely repeated earlier results. For network invariants, we have presented a result that guarantees the existence of a network invariant, provided that there is a simple computational invariant.
Veri cation by Backwards Reachability Analysis
We should point out that our results are only partial, and we believe that they can be made stronger. As they are, they indicate that simple network invariants exists whenever simple computational invariants exist. The results also show that the construction of both simple network and computational invariants can be automated for nite-state systems with only bounded synchronization.
